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Intellectual Freedom: Everything  
is Dangerous  
 
Matthew Sharpe
“Everything is dangerous…” — Michel Foucault
 
In a series of lectures conducted near the end of his life, Michel Foucault 
examined the emergence and evolution of the Greek term Parrhesia, roughly 
“all-telling”.  In a felicitous mistranslation, the lectures were published in English 
under the title Fearless Speech.  This English rendering of the Greek captures 
one point of Foucault’s emphasis which holds true today, and which I want to 
take as my theme in what follows.  
 Frank speaking and the intellectual freedom it supposes is always 
a complex, perilous, and contested reality.  More a privilege than a right, 
sometimes an onerous obligation, its practice periodically requires courage in 
the face of a host of forces acting and speaking against it—if not the kinds of 
lethal persecution visited on figures like Socrates or Giordano Bruno, or even the 
censorship and book burnings of more spectacular times, then the subtler forms 
of social ostracism, economic disenfranchisement, psychological harm and 
professional marginalisation.  
 Nothing eternal or transcendent guarantees the survival of intellectual 
freedom in its different forms and dimensions: neither the institutions built to 
enshrine it; nor the methodologies of inquiry on which its meaningful practice 
rests; nor the individuals and communities who are its votaries.  Its enemies are 
legion: inherited prejudices, immanent and transcendent; the invariant need of 
scholars to belong and to conform; the material necessities that still prevent 
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the greatest number from accessing either the leisure or other means to freely 
inquire; the inveterate aversion even the most liberal-minded person feels to 
“negative instances” facing beliefs s/he has taken to be compelling; and today, 
the single-minded pursuit of “utility” or economic growth to which public policy 
is wedded around the world, “to the exclusion of all others”. 
 At each stage of Parrhesia’s emergence in the Greek texts, Foucault points 
to tensions characterising the very idea, as well as the practice of this “frank 
speech”.  In the democratic age, for instance, the formal and institutionalised 
right of all male citizens to speak openly in the Athenian assemblies and law 
courts created conditions which favoured demagoguery: the short-sighted 
flattery of the hoi polloi which would lead Athens into disaster through the 
regnancy of figures like Alcibiades and Cleon.  Yet the dependency of the 
privileged intellectual advisor on the monarch or tyrant, in an alternative ancient 
model of parrhesia, hardly insulates the former from difficulties of the kind 
Dionysius duly visited on Plato.  Mutatis mutandis, this form of parrhesia hardly 
insures the hoi polloi from the danger of prescriptions which scorn the public 
good in the name of serving the ends of a privileged few.  
 Such tensions about “intellectual freedom” seem to go all the way down.  
To inquire as and into what subjects we want—which is most often intended 
when we use this term—is not the freedom to arbitrarily posit as and what we 
wish.  If it is to be meaningful, such freedom will be subordinated to epistemic 
values like the desire for truth or wisdom.  But to discover a truth or truths 
is to be bound by them, as Hannah Arendt noted.  The “freedom” to deny a 
round earth or climate change, despite confirmation after confirmation across 
centuries or decades, is scarcely worth the term.   Freedom of thought implies 
openness to be challenged and criticised, and criticism is never pleasant, 
especially when it is earnt and demands retraction or revision.  Sometimes, if our 
opinion seems to critics to be not simply erroneous but rationally groundless or 
self-serving, criticism can become personal and abusive.  
 There are always, finally, potential tensions between truth, an epistemic 
value, and people’s normative convictions about the right, the good, the socially 
necessary or expedient.  Many established, collective practices have rested 
either on shared illusions or on the ignorance about the whole truth of at least 
one involved party—an historical premise from which we can, incidentally, infer 
that many of our established beliefs and practices today will seem foolish to 
future generations, should intellectual freedom prevail. 
 No one then should in no way take intellectual freedom for granted.  In the 
words of Walter G. Metzger in an important 20th century study on the subject: 
  
No one can follow the history of academic freedom … without 
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wondering at the fact that any society, interested in the immediate 
goals of solidarity and self-preservation, should possess the vision 
to subsidize free criticism and inquiry, and without feeling that 
the academic freedom we still possess is one of the remarkable 
achievements of man.  At the same time, one cannot but be appalled 
at the slender thread by which it hangs, at the wide discrepancies that 
exist among institutions with respect to its honouring and preservation; 
and one cannot but be disheartened by the cowardice and self-
deception that frail men use who want to be both safe and free.  With 
such conflicting evidence, perhaps individual temperament alone tips 
the balance toward confidence or despair. 
Today, despair reigns ascendant in the universities which were set up, at 
least in part, to provide enclaves for intellectual freedom.  These institutions 
were established, first in medieval Europe and then in different modern 
configurations, on the model of public corporations or trusts, as against private 
businesses or direct arms of government.  If free inquiry in the service of 
discovering truths, preserving traditions, and cultivating educated citizens is 
to flourish, the thought was, it must be insulated (as far as possible) from the 
pressures facing people in economic or political life: pressures whose effect 
on intellectual inquiry will foreseeably favour suppressing or misrepresenting 
inconvenient truths; strategically calculating disclosure or deceit; and basing 
claims, where necessary, on different forms of well-seeming sophistry.  
 Blind or double-blind peer review, for instance, is a practice intended to 
insulate the assessment of scholars’ knowledge claims from the vested interests 
of “governments ecclesiastic, monarchic or oligargic”, so only the best-qualified, 
neutral readers will assess its merits.  Tenure, likewise, is a medieval inheritance 
supposed to protect scholars from fear of firing for pursuing their inquiries 
wherever evidence and argument may take them.  It is predicated on a sense 
that the scholar cannot perform optimally, pursuing truth without fear or favour, 
as a vulnerable employee, an interested advocate, or an invested entrepreneur.
 But today, publics’ “trust” around the world has been eroded by 
decades of “culture wars”.  This mistrust has been cultivated in the business 
and governing elites by neoconservative discourses about “liberal” or “left-
wing” elites allegedly monopolising chairs, appointments, editorial boards, and 
suppressing intellectual freedom in the universities.  Neoliberal “public choice” 
doctrines convergently suggest that all human behaviour is so inveterately self-
interested that the only way “efficiency” can be wrought from this crooked 
timber is by institutionalising regimes of surveillance and auditing: in the case 
of academia, quantifying scholarly work (books, articles, now citation counts 
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and grant dollars) and placing scholars, in new ways, in competition with each 
other for the material preconditions of their trade (fellowships, jobs, grants, 
promotions).  University publishing houses have been commercialised or shut 
down; academic journals have likewise been widely bought up by commercial 
publishers, who resell electronic access to them to university libraries; and 
collegial self-governance has been supplanted by increasing numbers of 
managers coming from the private sector, without experience in teaching and 
higher education.  The casualization of teaching and increasing of class sizes 
has led to significant “deskilling” in the “sector”, robbing individuals of the time 
or scholia to keep abreast of their fields, let alone broaden their minds.  The 
“block grants” that were hitherto entrusted to universities to teach and research 
have been rolled back, making institutional funding dependent on increased 
marketing outlays, corporate sponsorship, and privately-funded researches 
often contingent upon academics signing in-confidence agreements to ensure 
the patentability of results.
 Increasingly, as this week, stories circulate in the global media about 
scholars being pressured to say “the right things” by universities’ sponsors or 
the academic board; or even being demoted or fired, like Thane Naberhaus and 
Ted Egan at Mount St. Mary’s University in the US.  These men were sacked 
for an alleged lack of “loyalty” to their University, after criticising inflammatory 
remarks made by its President.  Entire humanities departments are being shut 
down, given the difficulty of rationalising the liberal arts in the terms of today’s 
regnant economism.
 These conditions have understandably led to a closing of ranks amongst 
the academic community, together with a nostalgia for former institutional 
dispensations.  Yet if everything is not dangerous, per Foucault’s bon mot, little 
is, was, or probably ever will be untroubled or perfect.  
 While learning and scholarship are directed, in themselves, towards 
discovering and transmitting truth, knowledge, and the cultivation of educated 
men and women, the institutionalisation of learning and scholarship involves 
forms of professionalization, many of whose marks and practices look back 
to precedents in the medieval guilds and aristocratic courts.  Socrates may 
have questioned the slave boy in the marketplace, and delighted in calling 
forth his geometrical knowledge.  But within any scholarly institution, even 
the most learned slave must earn her stripes, if the truth she is to speak is to 
be taken seriously in a conference hall, let alone by an academic publisher, an 
appointments panel, or a grants committee.  Each discipline at any given time 
has what sociologist Pierre Bourdieu called its own habitus, invisible to insiders 
but readily apparent to newcomers: its accepted ways of speaking, writing, 
referring (and deferring) to established authorities; its hierarchies of prestige 
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and power, up to and including institutional powers to appoint and promote; 
its established paths of credentialisation; and its unwritten ‘dos’ and ‘do nots’, 
sanctions, incentives and perks.  Any novitiate into a discipline must accordingly 
learn these unwritten rules if they are to win the material and symbolic capital to 
build a viable career in the field: 
On the one hand, […] disciplines are useful epistemic categories that 
allow for the production of expert knowledge […] On the other hand, 
[…] disciplines are political entities that wall off and control domains of 
discourse […] (Frodeman & Briggle) 
The legitimacy of this self-monitoring control turns upon the aforementioned 
protection of intellectual freedom from political, economic or other external 
determinants or “conflicts of interest”.  The internal dangers to this legitimacy, 
and thereby to intellectual freedom, come from the inveterate tendency of 
established opinions to harden into rigid, unquestioned orthodoxies; the 
tendency of scholarly disciplines in an increasingly specialised intellectual 
world to close in on themselves (scholars writing for scholars about scholars 
in languages closed to non-scholars, or even scholars across the hallway); the 
pressures favouring flattery over frank speech that operate in any hierarchical 
organisation; the sense of entitlement which comes from achieving any high 
place or belonging to any specialised status group; and the sometimes-fierce 
hostility to work which aims to criticise, apply or “popularise” intradisciplinary 
knowledges as a means to challenge, contextualise, and thereby open out its 
specialised knowledges to wider debate. 
 I add the propensity of “insiders,” particularly in conditions of growing 
threat to their status-group privileges, to react with fear and scorn towards the 
wider economic and political world within which their profession is nested and 
threatened.  There is what German historian Fritz Stern has called a “politics” 
to “the unpolitical man” who considers himself and peers as the beleaguered 
guardians of the realm of the “spirit”, soaring above the mundane concerns 
that divide the many.   As the widespread, troubling compliance of the German 
academic sector in National Socialism reflects, this politics is almost always 
tendentially antidemocratic, since its determinative axis is “expert versus non-
expert”: the latter of whom will always vastly outnumber the former.
 The threats faced by intellectual freedom today, then, in addition to 
those it has always faced, seem to this author to come not simply from the new 
economistic fundamentalism that has undermined the university as a public 
trust.  They come from the way that the new academic precarity and regimes 
of quantitative “incentivisation” intellectuals are subject to “select for” many 
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of those attributes of academic work that always pushed against free inquiry 
in the older configurations: the deference to established authorities rooted in 
asymmetries of institutional and symbolic capital; the willingness to give and 
receive flattery in order to climb the “winding stair”; the tendency of academic 
work, in the humanities, to be individually-based and tendentially atomising; and 
the insular closure of disciplines upon themselves, ideally to promote intellectual 
freedom but, when faced with external threats, to guard established symbolic 
and institutional territory.
 To combat despair, we should remember that intellectual freedom has 
never been the exclusive provenance of the universities.  The renaissance, 
reformation, scientific revolution and enlightenment were all spearheaded 
by free thinkers located outside of the academy.  But to combat the internal 
and external forces working against intellectual freedom within the neoliberal 
academy will take a long struggle, a significant change in the wider terms of 
public discourse, and not least, a good deal of fearless speech. 
